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Accounting as an Instrument of Neoliberalisation? 
Exploring the Adoption of Fair Value Accounting in China 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose – This paper explores the implementation of fair value accounting (FVA) in 
China as part of a global process of neoliberalisation and financialisation of political 
and economic systems. It establishes that FVA forms part of the technical architecture 
of neoliberalism. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – In considering the processes of neoliberalisation in 
China, this paper uses a qualitative approach to explore some of the impacts the 
adoption of FVA has had on Chinese capital markets.  
 
Findings – It is shown that the practice of FVA is imbued with assumptions about the 
state and the market that have little bearing on the realities of Chinese capital markets. 
Rather than advancing the public interest, as neoliberal theories claim, this accounting 
change has failed to transform political and economic power. Instead, it has provided 
another opportunity to reposition powerful political and economic elites both inside 
and outside China. This paper argues that the process has reconfigured capital markets 
in the image of those in advanced capitalist economies, but is devoid of the regulatory 
and socio-political apparatus to rationalise its relevance and reliability in the Chinese 
context. 
 
Originality/value – By positioning the research in broader literature of neoliberalism, 
this paper offers an alternative framing of the purpose of adopting FVA and, more 
broadly, the globalisation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
 
Keywords Fair Value Accounting; Neoliberalism; Financialisation; Free Market; 
Chinese Accounting Standards; Chinese Capital Markets. 
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While many general accounts of global transformations and their effects are now 
available, what is generally missing…is the political-economic story of where 
neoliberalization came from and how it is proliferated on the world stage (Harvey 2005, 
p. 4 emphasis added). 
 
[T]he move to fair value accounting is already being hotly debated, embroiling not only 
national accounting regulators but also the already increasingly challenged International 
Accounting Standards Board. Whilst one strand of research has most certainly 
encouraged moves in this direction, there is now an emerging interest in looking at the 
actual ways in which the changes were realised. How, in other words, have very abstract 
conceptual ideas been realised in practice, how have the inherent ambiguities been 
operationalised in calculative terms, and with what wider consequences? (Hopwood 2009, 
p. 797). 
 
 
Introduction 
At the start of the Chinese communist regime, China adopted an accounting 
system that supported and sustained its communist political commitment. Accounting 
within communist China played a different role to that of accounting within capitalist 
societies (Zhang et al. 2009). This, however, has changed dramatically since China’s 
decision to converge its national accounting standards with International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2007. The convergence was regarded by both the 
Chinese government and the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) as “an 
important step for the development of the Chinese economy and its place in the 
world’s increasingly integrated capital markets” (Tweedie 2006, p. 6). Within China, 
the adoption of fair value accounting (FVA) into the new Chinese accounting 
standards (CAS, otherwise known as Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
or ASBE)1 has met with considerable interest. Many Chinese accounting academics 
(Ge & Xu 2006, Liu & Zhang 2006, Wang 2006, Lu et al. 2007) have argued that the 
adoption of FVA in China is evidence of a profound departure from previous practice, 
where FVA was completely prohibited.  
 
Globally, the progress of FVA is controversial, and the source of considerable 
debate from both the accounting community and the broader public. This was 
particularly acute during the 2007-2011 global financial crisis (GFC) (O'Malley & 
Hofste 2003, Barth 2004, Landsman 2007, Penman 2007, Ronen 2008, Sunder 2008, 
Whittington 2008, Hopwood 2009, McSweeney 2009, Roberts & Jones 2009, Zack 
2009). There is, however, a lack of research documented in English regarding FVA in 
China. This paper contributes to this literature, providing insights into the deeper 
ideological motivation underpinning FVA and its influence on China’s socio-
economic transformation. In pursuing Harvey’s (2005) call for a deeper understanding 
of the mechanisms used to grow neoliberalism internationally, we argue that despite 
the economic crisis, FVA remains a significant technology of neoliberalism.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section Two broadly discusses the 
relationships between neoliberalism and financial markets, FVA, financialisation and 
the global economy; Section Three specifically explores the case of FVA in China 
and the effect its introduction has had on Chinese capital markets; Section Four 
exemplifies the argument by examining the split-share-structure market reform of 
China; and finally, Section Five summarises the arguments and draws conclusions.  
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Financial Markets and Neoliberalism 
 
Neo-liberalism evolved historically. It is not a static phenomenon, nor was it born fully 
formed. We are better advised to…speak of the process of 'neoliberalisation'...implying 
an ongoing and uneven process, yet with shared features and logics across space and 
time. One implication of this is that national variations in neoliberalism must be taken 
into account (Cahill 2010, p. 306) 
 
 The reorganisation of relationships between states and their economies since 
the 1980s has seen policies of privatisation, marketisation and deregulation promoted 
globally. Such policy shifts change the nature of both the public and private sectors 
(Goddard 2002, Christensen & Skaerbaek 2007, Andrews & Entwistle 2010) by 
lifting regulatory restrictions on the way businesses conduct themselves both 
nationally and internationally. Such changes have been labelled neoliberal 
transformations – or neoliberalism2 (Harvey 2005, Cahill 2010, Cooper et al. 2010). 
Proponents of neoliberalism argue that the best rules and conditions for markets to 
flourish include: deregulation of financial markets; privatisation; weakening of 
institutions of social protection; weakening of labour unions and labour-market 
protections; shrinking of government; cutting of top tax rates; opening up of 
international goods and capital markets; and abandonment of full employment under 
the guise of the natural rate (Friedman & Friedman 1980, Munck 2005, Palley 2005, 
Gamble 2006).  
 
The appropriate level of interaction between a state and its economy is long 
contested. Neoliberalism emerges from this debate, advocating less government 
intervention and more market freedom. However, Cahill (2010) juxtaposes this 
articulated ideal with ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, which, he argues, is very 
different when put into operation (Cahill 2010). His analysis of neoliberalism in 
Australia documents the regulatory requirements needed by the global market in order 
for a state to secure its ‘freedom’ (Rapacynski 1996, MacEwan 2005, Munck 2005, 
Gamble 2006, Ong 2006). That is, the ‘deregulation’ advocated by neoliberalism in 
theory may not reflect the nature of the actual practical relationship that a state has 
with its economy. This has led some political-economists to argue that an ‘activist 
state’ (Cahill 2010) is required to intervene and ‘re-regulate’ to overcome any 
obstacles and resistance to the institution of a ‘free’ economy. In line with this, 
MacEwan (2005, p. 172) cautioned that: 
 
Neoliberalism requires a strong state that can ensure the primacy of private property, 
preserve the dominance of markets over social control, and thus limit the operation of 
democratic power. Also, neoliberalism often requires a strong state, sometimes a 
dictatorial state, for its implementation. 
 
In fact, the “making of markets” (Munck 2005, p. 61) is a contested political 
process, and not a natural state, as much neoliberal theory  asserts.  For example, Karl 
Polanyi, commenting on the 19th-century Industrial Revolution, argued that “the 
emergence of national markets was in no way the result of the gradual and 
spontaneous emancipation of the economic sphere from governmental control” 
(Polanyi 1957, p. 258); rather, “the market has been the outcome of a conscious and 
often violent intervention on the part of government which imposed the market 
organisation on society for non-economic ends” (Polanyi 1957, p. 258). In the context 
of contemporary economic globalisation, the market relies on institutional support, 
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such as the international rules to ensure intellectual-property protection or trade 
arbitration. The construction of this institutional environment is often negotiated 
among powerful states with unequal terms attached, such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (Munck 2005). 
 
In a similar vein, Ellwood and Newberry (2007)  contend that  effective 
neoliberalism  requires an “iron tripod” of regulation, comprising: independently 
administered monetary policy; macro-level fiscal discipline; and micro-level 
economic reforms for trade liberalisation. Further, Merino et al. (2010, p. 775), 
observe that “neoliberalism fosters corporate hegemony since it treats the market as 
an omnipotent God that should direct the fate of human beings”. Whilst advancing 
policies of ‘deregulation’ (removal of state regulatory systems that intervene in 
markets), it is contended, rather, that neoliberalism reconfigures regulation with 
market-oriented rules and policies to facilitate the development of a new form of 
capitalism. It is a new form of capitalism in which there are clear winners and losers 
(Harvey 2010), and one in which global accounting regulations lubricate and 
legitimise this process (Boyer 2007, Newberry & Robb 2008, Hopwood 2009, 
McSweeney 2009, Roberts & Jones 2009). Transformations promoting the ideology 
and epistemology of neoliberalism have ensued, albeit unevenly, wherein “capital 
mobility was encouraged, free trade was sanctified, labour was made more ‘flexible’ 
and macro-economic management became fully market compliant”  (Munck 2005, p. 
61). 
 
 Neoliberalism and Crisis 
Much research on neoliberalism demonstrates the corresponding rise in 
significance of the global financial system in contemporary capitalism (George 1988, 
Wade & Veneroso 1998, Clarke 2005, Harvey 2005): 
 
The support of financial institutions and the integrity of the financial system became the 
central concern of the collectivity of neoliberal states (such as the group comprising the 
world’s richest countries known as the G7). In the event of a conflict between Main 
Street and Wall Street, the latter was to be favoured…. While the slogan was often 
advanced in the 1960s that what was good for General Motors was good for the US, this 
had changed by the 1990s into the slogan that what is good for Wall Street is all that 
matters (Harvey 2005, p. 33). 
 
There is also strong evidence (Harvey 2005, Panitch & Gindin 2005, 
Soederberg 2005, Toporowski 2005) to support the view that neoliberalisation has 
created greater socio-economic inequity. Stiglitz (2011) has written extensively about 
the deepening socio-economic inequities that have emerged over the last 25 years – in 
the US alone, the top 1 percent of Americans now takes home 25 percent of the 
nation’s income every year. In China, there are regular reports of the emerging ‘super 
rich’, but underpinning these ‘great successes’ are income inequities that have never 
been higher (Lee 2010). The international response to the 2007-2011 GFC is a good 
example of the unevenness of state intervention under neoliberalism. The crisis and its 
impact on both Main Street and Wall Street saw an acceleration of government 
intervention to ensure their ongoing survival. For the most part, policy-makers 
couched this intervention in terms of ‘social benefit’, whilst under-reporting the long-
term social debt that resulted from risk-exposed capital markets seeking to minimise 
the consequences of excessive financialisation (Lapavitsas 2009). 
 
5 
 
Research on the social impacts of neoliberalism (Wang 2003, Harvey 2005, Ong 
2006, Klein 2007) notes new processes of class formation emerging: the rise of 
finance and financial services producing a surge in the remuneration of CEOs of 
financial corporations; new sectors, such as biotechnology and information 
technologies, allowing individuals in advanced economies to accumulate 
unprecedented fortunes (for example, Bill Gates and Paul Allen); individuals and 
families (such as the Suharto family or the newly emerged Chinese entrepreneurs with 
a Chinese Communist Party background) with a privileged relationship to state power 
that has made them  immensely rich; and the privatisation of public assets re-
allocating wealth  to a small group of individuals, as exemplified by Russia’s 
notorious oligarchs or ‘the princelings’ in China (Harvey 2005, Klein 2007). 
 
The reform path that China has undertaken since the late 1970s has aligned it 
with this broader neoliberal context. The extant literature illustrates the following 
major characteristics of China’s economic reform: the establishment of ‘markets’ in 
the economy, adhering to a central-plan and public ownership (Shirk 1993, Solinger 
1993, Wang 1994); the expansion of the markets by fostering international trade and 
opening up domestic markets for overseas capital (Lardy 1995, Gao 1996, Prasad & 
Wei 2008); the massive privatisation of public assets and state-owned enterprises 
(Krug 1997, Song 2004, Guthrie 2006); the substantial withdrawal of the government 
from social-welfare provision (Wang 2003, Harvey 2005, Ong 2006); an active 
participation in the world economy by seeking membership in international 
organisations, such as the WTO (Garnaut et al. 2001, Song 2004); and  the voluntary 
convergence of domestic standards with international ones, such as the IFRS (Zhang 
et al. 2009). All of this signals China’s intention to be seen as a ‘free market’ through 
its active construction of institutional arrangements that signal economic freedom to 
capital markets. Much attention has been paid to the large scale institutional changes 
that have been occurring in China, but we still know little about the processes and 
practices that are essential to the neoliberalisation of the global economy (Harvey 
2005). The remainder of this paper explores the role of FVA in this process, with a 
spotlight on China, its recent decision to commit itself to IFRS and its preference for 
FVA.  
 
Fair Value Accounting and Neoliberalism 
The political economy approach critiqued the notion that accounting is a neutral, 
objective technology that functions to improve the allocative efficiency of markets, and 
emphasized instead the ways in which accounting is a partisan practice that is implicated 
in distributive transfers of wealth between social classes. In this view, accounting both 
shapes and is shaped by relations of power within the political economy in which it 
operates. Accounting is, thus, seen as essentially political; accounting policies are 
influenced by ruling elites and dominant ideologies, and accounting practices, in turn, 
affect the distribution of income, wealth and power within society (Arnold 2009, p. 805). 
 
By positioning FVA in a broader neoliberal context, this paper contributes to the 
debates on FVA and the broader discussions on the globalisation of IFRS. We argue 
that FVA is an accounting method that forms part of the architecture of neoliberalism, 
embedding the broader ideological commitments of neoliberal globalisation within 
accounting techniques. In many ways this is obvious, yet few researchers have 
explored the ideological bias of FVA and its dependence on institutionalised market 
freedoms that may, or may not, be appropriate. This ideological commitment is 
apparent if we understand that FVA requires a belief in free markets that are 
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underscored by interventionist states (Cahill 2010). Its success lies in the capacity to 
align accounting techniques to the interests of financial capital, whilst maintaining an 
image of objectivity and masquerading as a teller of financial ‘truths’. Given the focus 
of this research, we attempt to engage with Arnold’s (2009, p. 805) call for deeper 
explorations of the link between “micro level regulatory and accounting technologies 
and the macro level economy”. 
 
Given that a ‘fair’ value, according to the definition, is the value determined in 
an arm’s-length transaction between willing and knowledgeable parties, a ‘free’ 
market is essential to the functioning of FVA. This is also evident in the IASB’s 
(2006) discussion paper, which prescribes the interpretation of fair value within the 
US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) standards as being a current 
market sale price. From this perspective, the price determined by the market will 
represent the ‘fair’ value. However, associating the market with fairness obscures the 
expanding inequities that have emerged from within the centres of advanced 
capitalism.  
 
Theoretically, an underlying assumption of FVA is that prices derived from 
arm’s-length market transactions reflect effective analysis of all necessary 
information required to create an accurate valuation (McSweeney 2009). By extension, 
markets are deemed to be self-optimising and are therefore presumed to accurately 
value assets. According to the theory, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market ensures that 
‘irrational’ decisions by individual buyers or sellers are not sufficient to undermine 
the accuracy of the prices collectively determined by rational buyers and sellers. That 
is, there is no information asymmetry. Because the market utilises economic resources 
efficiently, the self-correction mechanism also enables a market to move naturally 
towards an equilibrium, when there is no ‘interference’ in the market (Smith 1961, 
Friedman 2002). Such ‘equilibrium’ is significant because it reflects the ‘magic’ 
power of the market to transform private interest into social optima (Palma 2009). It is 
a view of the market that has been persuasive, and it underscores the successful 
expansion of neoliberal ideology across the globe (Harvey 2005, Ong 2006, Klein 
2007).  
 
Fair Value Accounting and Financialisation 
 Although many would argue that FVA has emerged because it provides users 
with the most relevant information for decision-making (e.g. Financial Accounting 
Standards Board 2009), its popularity cannot be understood without reference to the 
changing nature of advanced capitalism. Emerging demands for FVA valuations 
reflect a shift in the world economy toward service-oriented and information-oriented 
businesses since the 1980s (Dumenil & Levy 2005, Fishman et al. 2007). Within the 
changing economic context, Robinson (2006, p. 13) notes, “the expanding energy, 
finance and technology sectors were to become major beneficiaries and central pillars 
within the neo-liberal camp”. Although these trends are not new, they have 
accelerated in the last 20 years (Fine 2010, Harvey 2010).  
 
  The feature of contemporary neoliberalisation that most profoundly affects the 
global economy is its ‘financialisation’3 (Froud et al. 2004, Gleadle & Cornelius 2008, 
Newberry & Robb 2008, Andersson et al. 2010). Neoliberal capitalism has seen the 
scale of finance grow exponentially, with many arguing it is out of proportion to 
production (Bryan & Rafferty 2006). As Newberry and Robb (2008, p. 743) have 
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noted, “the increased power of financial markets prompts companies to pursue goals 
set by the financial markets, rather than operational goals related to their production 
function”. The value of financial assets and finance-based incomes as a percent of 
GDP has risen dramatically throughout the world; for example, “in the US, share 
market capitalisation as a percent of GDP rose from its long-term average of about 50 
percent to 185 percent in 1999” (Crotty 2005, p. 85). The financial-services industry's 
share of corporate profits in the US was around 10 percent in the early 1980s, but 
peaked at 40 percent in 2007 (Bank for International Settlements 2008). In the US in 
2003, “the outstanding amounts [of the derivatives market] are 19 times the size of the 
US economy, while trading volume on exchanges was over 79 times the US GDP” 
(Dodd 2005, p. 150). According to the Bank for International Settlements,  over the 
period 1999-2009 (Palma 2009, p. 834), the global amounts outstanding on over-the-
counter derivative contracts jumped from US$92 trillion to US$683 trillion (7.5 
times), or from 2.4 to 11 times the size of global output. 
 
This shift to a financial economy sees the proliferation of complex financial 
instruments, such as derivatives, and a decline in the traditional trade- and production-
based economy (Bank for International Settlements 2008, Dore 2008, Fine 2010). 
This financialisation process has two observable impacts on world economies: the 
decoupling of the non-financial and financial sectors, and an increase in financial 
speculation. First, according to Palma (2009), increased financialisation has led to a 
shrinking of non-financial trade activities, such as import and export trade, because of 
the impact of the overwhelming growth of the financial sector. Secondly, 
financialisation has introduced massive financial speculation into other sectors. This 
penetration of the financial sector into the rest of the economy has made real 
production sectors more fragile through their exposure to the substantial fluctuations 
of the financial market. Bryan et al. (2009) argue that, through increased securitisation, 
capital previously held in physical assets (such as machinery) or illiquid forms (such 
as mortgages) can now be made much more liquid, as is the case with holding 
financial derivatives. This shift has provided more ‘freedom’ for the owners of capital, 
which was previously tied to fixed and illiquid items. They are now able to make 
faster returns by taking advantage of the ‘short-term’ trading modes in financial 
markets.  
 
It is in this ‘short-termism’ that the financialisation process has directly 
affected corporate governance behaviours. Market capitalisation is normatively 
ascribed as the ‘fundamental’ firm value, premised upon the efficient-market 
hypothesis and its assumptions, including: no information asymmetry; rationality on 
the part of decision-makers; the stability of economic structures; and the primacy of 
self-interest (Mouck 1990, Sterling 1990, Lazonick & O'Sullivan 2000). This norm is 
so firmly and uncritically established that the unreal assumptions upon which it is 
built are virtually invisible (McSweeney 2009). Under the disciplinary effect of the 
‘market of corporate control’ 4 , the managerial behaviour of contemporary 
corporations no longer pursues long-term growth, but prefers short-term distributional 
goals for shareholders (Kotz 2009).  
 
As the focus of business operations moves away from productive activities to 
finance-oriented activities, the shares of many firms are traded at increasingly higher 
multiples of 'book value' (Palma 2009). These book values are understood as 
reflecting the 'intangible' values of the firm, including intellectual property such as 
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trademarks, trade names, patents and formulas; goodwill; the value of research and 
development; and, more importantly, the increased value of the financial capital. 
More specifically, financialisation has meant an increase in speculative and highly 
mobilised financial flows, which has led many to argue that a financial-reporting 
system built upon historical cost measurement would fail to satisfy the needs of 
‘users’. Users, as construed in the context of financial capitalism, demand the most 
up-to-date information to maximise their chance of optimising their gains in the 
market. The popularity of FVA, therefore, can be viewed as a product of the needs of 
participants in financial markets. Instead of conservatively tempering the excesses of 
financialisation, as in the wake of the GFC, accounting has become an instrument of 
neoliberalisation, because it has promoted a view that a ‘fair value’ is a value that is 
most relevant to speculative decision-making within a ‘free’ financial market.  
 
FVA promotes the mark-to-market valuations of many financial assets, such 
as ‘securitised’ assets, swaps, and collateralised debt obligations; these are often 
readily available in active markets5, and thereby used in practice (Plantin et al. 2008). 
Financial evaluation models strengthened collective belief that financial asset values 
are readily measurable through discounted cash flow analysis (McSweeney 2009, 
Bezemer 2010). For those infrequently traded or non-traded assets, there is 
considerable management discretion in determining the amount and timing of asset 
valuation and/or revaluation (McSweeney 2009). Yet the level of management 
judgement required in the pricing process has been neglected in much of the FVA 
debate. The effects of financialised markets, as evidenced in the 2007-2011 GFC, 
have also reflected the failure of accounting to consider the problematic relationship 
between financial accounting and macroeconomic instability (Arnold 2009). Given all 
of this, we understand FVA to be a technology of neoliberalism, offering technical 
legitimacy to markets. The role of accounting here is deeply ideological, and it serves 
to sustain specific elites (Harvey 2005, Arnold 2009). We now turn to a discussion of 
China to explore this in more detail. 
 
Fair Value Accounting in China 
China’s economic growth has been extraordinary. But with this growth have come new 
challenges: rampant corruption, increasing social unrest, rising levels of inequalities, the 
yearning for democracy, and the spread of ideas foreign and inimical to the perceived 
interests of the communist state (Li 2010, p. 1). 
 
The remainder of this paper explores the accounting arrangements of financial 
instruments as they are being applied in China. The Chinese accounting standard –
ASBE 22: Recognition and Measurement of Financial Instruments 6 , which is 
equivalent to IAS 39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement – has 
brought about the most significant changes to Chinese listed companies’ financial 
reporting since the introduction of the new CAS in 2007. As a result, it provides a 
strong empirical platform to explore and contextualise the ideas presented above. 
 
As FVA7 must draw its valuations from Chinese capital markets, knowledge 
of these markets is important in order to understand how ASBE 22 operates in China. 
FVA requires that the assets acquired and liabilities incurred are reported on the 
balance sheet at prices that would be adopted in current market transactions at the 
measurement date; and that the increases or decreases in the hypothesised ‘prices’ of 
assets and liabilities are recognised as incomes and expenses in income statements. 
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This approach, as mediated through the ASBE 22, has led to huge volatilities in the 
reported profits of Chinese listed companies. This is evidenced in the market 
turbulence between 2006 and 2008: the Shanghai Composite Index increased 
continuously from 1200 points in January 2006 to the highest point 6092 points in 
October 2007 – a jump of 408 percent in less than two years; at a similar rate, the 
Shanghai Composite Index dropped from 6092 points on 16 October 2007 to 1728 
points on 31 October 2008 – a fall of 72 percent in one year. Since then the markets 
have been relatively stable, with the index never exceeding 3400 points until January 
20108. 
 
Under ASBE 22, financial assets are to be measured at their fair values, and 
any variation is recorded in the profits and losses of the current period (Chinese 
Accounting Standards Committee 2009). Companies holding Chinese shares must 
recognise any share-price changes as either profits or losses. This can be very 
significant, as many Chinese companies have cross-holdings in other companies. In 
2007, 1135 listed companies  held other companies’ shares, accounting for about 78 
percent of total listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Shi 
2007). Consequently, listed companies’ profits were boosted greatly by the strong 
performance of the capital markets between 2006 and 2007. This dramatic market 
fluctuation was reflected in listed companies’ financial statements, because of the 
application of FVA as required by the new CAS.  
 
Two examples of large Chinese companies, one a manufacturer and the other 
in the financial services industry, illustrate this argument. The Livzon Group, a 
leading pharmaceutical company in China (listed on the ShenZhen Stock Exchange as 
000513), reported that its net profit for the first quarter of 2008 fell by 73.53 percent 
compared to the same period in the previous year. This was despite net profits from 
operating activities of 142.18 million Yuan (RMB) - an increase of 34.19 percent 
compared to the period of 2007. The decreases in prices of cross-holding shares 
contributed a loss of 170.85 million Yuan (RMB) (Wang 2008). Similarly, China 
Credit Trust Co. Ltd., a major non-banking financial institution, reported a half-year 
loss of 317 million Yuan (RMB) in September 2008, while in the previous year it 
reported a profit of 931 million Yuan (RMB) (Huang 2008). The biggest contributor 
to this loss is changes in the fair value of cross-holding shares (Huang 2008, Wang 
2008). The Secretary of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, Li Xiaoxue, 
acknowledged that one-third of the increases of profits of listed companies in 2007 
came from the fair value changes in the cross-holding shares of other listed companies 
(Li 2007).  
 
Outside China, this kind of volatility in reported earnings has been strongly 
contested within the accounting research. Whilst FVA is popular amongst business 
elites and standard-setters for the reasons outlined above, it meets with some 
resistance as the quality of FVA data is questioned (Barth et al. 1995, Barth 2004, 
King 2006, Landsman 2007, Penman 2007, Benston 2008, Whittington 2008, 
McSweeney 2009). The practice of FVA can also have a significant negative effect on 
financial markets, which became obvious during the 2007-2011 GFC. In a declining 
market, the decreases in ‘fair value’ reduce the value of assets on the balance sheet, 
and hence the bottom line numbers. The resulting paper losses forced many 
institutions to become unviable, including the biggest financial institutions in the US9. 
Given the level of debate within the accounting literature on the appropriateness or 
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otherwise of FVA, this was foreseeable long before the crisis (King 2006). Despite 
these technical limitations, we argue that the popularity of FVA lies elsewhere and 
can only really be understood when it is analysed as part of the broader political 
economy of neoliberalism. 
 
As discussed previously, FVA relies on free markets to operate, yet free 
markets require significant state intervention. This aspect has received little attention 
in accounting research to date. This co-dependence between free markets and state 
intervention is not an accident. Instead, we argue that the progress of neoliberalism 
relies in part on technical rationalisations of its legitimacy. FVA provides this, whilst 
masking the activist role of the state (Cahill 2010). Nowhere is this tension more 
apparent than in China. To exemplify this argument, this paper critiques the Split 
Share Structure Reform (SSSR) that the Chinese government has been implementing 
since 2005. This reform has affected share prices, and correspondingly influenced the 
‘fair values’ of shares in China. In reality, the Chinese market is a creation of the state 
and its reforms – yet the illusion of free markets and fair values has been sustained. 
We contend that this illusion is sustained by FVA and is critical to the 
neoliberalisation of China.  
 
Fair Value Accounting and Free Markets? The Split Share Structure 
Reform (SSSR) 
 
FVA requires a free market to create meaningful valuations; however, ‘free 
markets’ have always been elusive. This is particularly true in China given its political 
and economic history. In reality, markets across the globe have required the active 
intervention of the state to sustain the legal and policy architecture in which they 
operate. They have also relied on the state to protect them from their own excesses 
and failures10. This disconnection between the theory and reality of free markets has 
underpinned neoliberalism. In fact, many have argued that the illusion of a free 
market forms part of the power of neoliberalism; and it should not be understood as 
an anathema, but rather as a lubricant to the freedoms and protections found when 
neoliberalism is explored in practice (Thorsen 2010). Mapping the disconnection 
between theory and practice is critical to our understanding of how the illusion of free 
markets is sustained and institutionalised. FVA plays a significant role in this story as 
it institutionalises, within accounting, the idea that markets are an unbiased arbiter of 
value, and thus lubricates the progress of neoliberalism. Its promise of fairness in 
values obtained through the market mechanism that can be reported as financial truths 
has had widespread appeal.  
 
The discussion of the SSSR provides an opportunity to explore the ‘ideal’ of 
the free market as it works in practice. We argue that there is a significant disconnect 
between theory and practice, and that this disconnection is reinforced through the 
application of FVA. A close look at this reform reveals just how inappropriate FVA is 
in China from the point of view of a technical valuation. This suggests that its 
meaning is symbolic, as it signals a commitment to the neoliberalisation of the 
Chinese economy over and above its commitment to free markets or the accurate 
valuations that are said to sustain them.  
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Neoliberalising China through the SSSR 
The SSSR is a policy of the Chinese government to ‘free’ Chinese capital 
markets by transforming the share-ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. 
Chinese market inefficiency is said to be tied to the previous share-ownership 
structure, providing a strong impetus for reform (Young & McGuinness 2001, 
O'Connor et al. 2006, Francis et al. 2009).  
 
There are two types of shares that can be traded in Chinese capital markets, A-
shares and B-shares. A-shares comprise companies incorporated in mainland China; 
these shares are traded on the mainland A-share markets. The prices of A-shares are 
quoted in RMB, and only mainlanders and selected foreign institutional investors are 
allowed to trade them. B-shares comprise companies incorporated in mainland China, 
and are traded in the mainland B-share markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen). B-shares 
are quoted in foreign currencies. In the past, only foreigners were allowed to trade B-
shares. This changed in March 2001 when mainlanders were permitted to trade B-
shares as well. However, they must trade with legal foreign-currency accounts. 
 
Prior to the June 2005 reform, the total market capitalisation of A-share listed 
companies in the Chinese share markets was RMB 735.6 billion, among which the 
value of the non-tradable shares (state-owned shares) was RMB 469.4 billion, 
accounting for 64 percent of the total capital (Zhang 1992). In other words, only about 
36 percent of shares issued by listed companies were freely available to investors. The 
government also imposed very clear quantitative restrictions on both the number of 
companies that could go public and the maximum number of shares that could be 
issued in a given year (Liu 2006)11. This kind of regulation presented a challenge for 
China, because it was seen to constrain ‘market freedom’ – an anathema to any self-
respecting capital market. The ‘freeing’ of markets from these kinds of constraints 
was seen as a step towards modernisation (Guthrie 2006); it also signalled the opening 
of another market to the kinds of speculative investments that had been championed 
elsewhere. Therefore, the SSSR was supposed to reform the market in the image of 
those found in advanced capitalist economies, and to provide an appropriate forum 
through which FVA could operate. 
 
 Although the Chinese government had good reasons for these interventions in 
capital markets in the past, they were increasingly difficult to defend in the context of 
global de-regulation of capital markets. Since the beginning of the significant 
economic reforms instigated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, “China’s mainstream state 
ideology...[has been] confronted with more and more challenges from a great variety 
of ideological trends” (Li 2010, p. 2). Many liberal intellectuals call for an acceptance 
of private property as a 'basic human right', and this call extends to ending state 
ownership of enterprises within China (Li 2010, p. 6)12. 
 
Given the global trend towards free markets and the deregulation of capital 
constraints, it was also difficult for China to attract capital into its markets, which is 
necessary to expand its economy and broaden economic prosperity. Government 
intervention predating the SSSR was widely criticised as distorting the supply-and-
demand relationship, thereby constraining capital expansion unnecessarily (Zhang 
1992, Wang & Xu 2004, Francis et al. 2009). In essence, the SSSR was introduced in 
order to transform non-tradable state shares into freely floating shares so that the 
markets could be ‘efficient’. However, as we have argued earlier, this is paradoxical, 
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as the establishment of a ‘free market’ requires significant intervention and re-
regulation. In fact, the SSSR required the government to regulate and enforce the 
adoption of IFRS and to promote the use of FVA.  
 
Although the stated objective of the SSSR is to increase market efficiency, the 
opening up of Chinese markets to powerful private interests also has the potential to 
create undesirable social outcomes (Li 2010). The reform was, in effect, a massive 
privatisation initiative, leading to the transfer of state (public) resources into private 
hands, which contradicted many of the ideological commitments of the central 
Chinese government. According to Li (2010, p. 8), the mounting discourse around 
globalisation mobilised a reconfiguring of China’s ideological commitments, which 
“helped transform the top leaders’ thinking regarding globalisation. Beijing not only 
endured lengthy negotiations and an ever-expanding set of requirements in order to 
join the WTO but also used the pro-market rules of that institution to overcome 
resistance to reform among die-hards inside China itself”. The privatisation of public 
assets was legitimised as part of the necessary reforms required by the WTO and was 
seen as a triumph by many within China. To those critical of the reform, however, it 
was described as a process of “accumulation by dispossession”, as it rewarded 
Chinese elites and sustained age-old inequities (Harvey 2005, 2010)13.  
 
The SSSR in Practice 
In China’s case, the SSSR was deliberately designed in two steps. The first step 
was to change the non-tradable state-owned shares to tradable shares in name, 
although these shares could not be traded in the markets immediately.   In effect, these 
shares were still non-tradable. This meant that while the change ostensibly signalled 
the transformation of the Chinese capital markets, it actually stalled the trading 
consequences. Article 27 of the Administrative Measures of the SSSR requires that: 
 
The sale of originally non-tradable shares after the reform plan is completed shall comply 
with the following provisions:  
(1)   The non-tradable shares shall not be traded or transferred within 12 months from the 
date of implementation of the reform plan;  
(2)   A former non-tradable shareholder who holds more than 5% of the total shares of a 
listed company, upon expiry of the lock-up period as stated in Article 27.1 of the 
Measures, may sell their shares, with a maximum of 5% of the total shares of the listed 
company within 12 months via the trading system of the stock exchanges, and not more 
than 10% within 24 months14. (China Securities Regulatory Commission 2005a) 
 
 The reform took effect on 8 May 2005 with “four companies including Sanyi 
Heavy Industries, Tsinghua Tongfang, Zijiang Enterprises, and Jinjiu Energy chosen 
as the first pilot companies” (Wan & Yuce 2007, p. 376). According to the rule, 
shares of those companies were no longer non-tradable state-owned shares, but they 
were still banned from trading for 12 to 24 months. The first float of these previously 
non-tradable shares did not enter the markets until 2007, with trading activity 
increasing significantly in 2008, 2009 and 2010 (see Table 1). Since then, all other 
listed companies have been scheduled to undertake the same reforms. 
 
 In Chinese, the requirement to liquidate the tradable shares after passing the 12- to 
24-month lock-up period is referred to as JieJin15. Table 1 is a timetable of the JieJin, 
which shows that by the end of 2010 most of the non-tradable A-shares had passed 
the lock-up period.  
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Table 1. Timetable of the JieJin  
 
Year (up to) Number of JieJin 
Shares (billion) 
Percentage of 
Total A-shares 
Market 
Capitalisation 
(billion RMB) 
Percentage of 
Total Market 
Capitalisation 
(billion RMB) 
31/12/2007 128.50 8.06% 2,244.20 7.29% 
31/12/2008 162.07 9.18% 2118.31 17.2% 
31/12/2009 685.09 37.81% 3458.71 27.16% 
31/12/2010 357.69 19.54% 3763.47 29.30% 
Source: Zhang (2009). 
 
 
The impact of this requirement on the supply of tradable shares has been enormous. 
As indicated by Li (2008), the A-share market capitalisation was about 7.1 trillion 
Yuan (RMB) up to 30 April 2008, and increased to 22.6 trillion Yuan (RMB) by 2010. 
In terms of the number of shares that could be exchanged from 2006 to 2008, Wan 
(2005, p. 180) predicted that:  
 
Under the policy that requires a 12- to 24-month lock-up period before selling those non-
tradable shares after their conversion into tradable shares, about 37 billion (5% of 740 
billion) non-tradable shares would become free floats after one year, which even exceeds 
the total amount of IPO issuing in 2003 and 2004. After the lock-up period, the whole 
free float would reach 300 billion shares, which could all be sold out as long as the 
market prices were greater than the current mean price of 2.8 Yuan/share…those 
shareholders of non-tradable shares would sell those shares high, and buy back low to 
maintain the control…there would be enormous pressures on the markets in the next three 
years16.  
 
The relationship between JieJin and share price has been investigated. Zhang 
(2009) identified a strong connection between a decline in share price and the 
increased volume of shares being JieJin. The research shows that in September 2007 
and March 2008,  the two months with the greatest quantities of JieJin shares being 
traded at one time, the market experienced significant falls (Zhang 2009, p. 2). The 
implication is that the JieJin dramatically increased the supply of shares in the market, 
resulting in a price fall.  
 
 Li (2008) noted that the arithmetic mean price of an A-share was about five Yuan 
(RMB) per share by the end of 2005, which had increased to over 15 Yuan (RMB) 
per share as of 30 April 2008. This meant that the average gain on selling previously 
non-tradable shares would have been over 200 percent in about two years – a 
situation that provided strong incentives for shareholders to sell off the shares and 
cash out the gains. That is why Ma et al. (2008, p. 2) warned: 
 
In 2007 the bull market has successfully absorbed the impacts of the JieJin; however, 
with the increasing amounts of JieJin and its cumulative effect, if the macro-economic 
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condition deteriorated and the market liquidity couldn’t catch up, the markets would 
suffer unbearably17.  
 
 A brief comparison of the market turnover, as shown in Table 2, sheds further 
light.  
Table 2.   Chinese share-market trends 
 
Year Market 
Capitalisation 
(billion RMB) 
Circulated Share 
Value 
(billion RMB) 
Transaction 
Number 
 (million) 
Volume  
(billion shares) 
Turnover 
(billion RMB) 
1991 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.81
1992 0.00 0.00 1.99 1.78 24.90
1993 0.00 0.00 24.43 14.74 234.05
1994 0.00 0.00 48.99 65.68 573.51
1995 0.00 0.00 44.36 51.28 310.35
1996 533.56 126.66 184.74 110.12 911.48
1997 0.00 0.00 158.01 121.57 1,376.32
1998 0.00 0.00 156.71 112.40 1,235.27
1999 1,458.05 424.97 179.71 156.04 1,696.58
2000 2,693.09 848.13 304.92 243.77 3,137.39
2001 2,759.06 838.21 209.75 182.00 2,270.94
2002 2,536.37 746.73 175.57 178.11 1,695.91
2003 2,980.49 820.11 206.61 269.28 2,082.41
2004 2,601.43 735.01 260.16 360.77 2,647.06
2005 2,309.61 675.46 210.14 398.66 1,924.02
2006 7,161.24 1,642.83 447.26 1,028.39 5,781.66
2007 26,983.89 6,453.22 1,617.33 2,432.54 30,543.43
2008 9,725.19 3,230.59 1,278.84 1,631.16 18,043.00
  Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange, www.sse.com.cn. 
 
 
 
For instance, the trading volume was 398.66 billion shares in 2005, which was the 
highest amount over the period before JieJin began; it jumped dramatically to 
1,028.39 billion shares in 2006 and 2,432.54 billion shares in 200718 – a leap of 158 
percent in 2006 and 510 percent in 200719. Despite these significant changes to the 
market brought about by government policy, no information has been disclosed about 
the exact number of JieJin shares in circulation. Given the influence JieJin had on the 
supply of shares, it is indisputable that this would have affected market conditions.  
 
Censorship, ‘Free’ Markets and the Chinese Elite 
  The SSSR reform has transformed Chinese capital markets significantly, but it 
has fallen short of providing the idealised free market. In fact, the reform presented an 
opportunity for the informed elite to make windfall gains by buying shares in newly 
privatised public assets. The SSSR held out great opportunity for the small percentage 
of the Chinese population positioned to take advantage of the reform, but these 
advantages were not widespread or inclusive, as little information about the reforms 
was made publicly available. The research articles upon which this paper draws are 
only accessible to researchers who are registered to receive information of this type, 
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and only after paying access fees. This excludes much of the broader Chinese public, 
and quarantines information to an elite group within China. This also prohibited any 
widespread debate about the strengths and weaknesses of the reform package.  
 
 Given the significant regulatory intervention required to construct a ‘free’ 
capital market, debates over the risks associated with the JieJin for share prices and 
the Chinese economy were sidelined in the public media between 2007 and early 
2008. For example, Sina.com.cn – one of the biggest financial websites in China – has 
a specific section (http://finance.sina.com.cn/nz/chinaggzw/3.shtml) dedicated to the 
SSSR. As of January 2010, the latest news was dated 16 July 2007. There were only 
five posts in 2007, and only one of these referred to the reform somewhat negatively, 
with the title 'Investment Fund Industry: there’s limited impact of the split share 
structure reform on the market20'. A browse of nearly 500 posts in 2006 reveals that 
most of the news was about how strong the shares had performed in the bull market. 
There were only two articles mentioning JieJin. One was on 8 August 2006 – 'The 
peak time of JieJin hasn’t come yet, A-shares bear hardly the pressure21 ' which 
briefly introduced the numbers of shares that would be allowed to circulate in 2007 
and 2008, but contained no evaluation of the consequences of the privatisation of 
state-owned assets on the market. The other was on 9 November 2006 – 'The amount 
of JieJin surges today, beware of the risk of selling off22', which only gave a brief 
introduction to the situation of JieJin for six specific companies 23 , but without 
referring to any broader impact on the market. Another section on the specific topic 
of JieJin from the web portal (http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/dafeixiaofei/4.shtml 
accessed on 15 June 2009) shows that no information at all was posted between 21 
March 2007 and 5 February 2008. On the official website of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, the section on the SSSR had not been updated since 20 
April 2007 (http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n4238522/n4238662/index.html, 
accessed on 21 July 2010)24. A further search on www.baidu.com – the biggest web-
searching engine25  in China – with the keywords “大 禁” (JieJin) shows 
similar patterns (accessed on 9 April 2011): there was a vast amount of news about 
JieJin and its disastrous effects on the markets, but the authors could not find any that 
had been posted before 2008. In other words, when shareholders were liquidating 
those previously non-tradable shares into the markets between 2007 to 2008, which 
was believed by some researchers (as discussed earlier in this paper) to cause the 
catastrophic drop in share prices, the public was not informed about this critical issue, 
as the media went silent on it. 
 
Based on our reading of the media at the time, it appears that mainstream 
media outlets did not discuss the issue of JieJin until the market reached its lowest 
point in early 200826 . The possibility that this was the result of massive media 
censorship is not farfetched. Indeed, there are a number of studies that document 
censorship as a daily routine in China, especially when the government is managing a 
significant social or economic reform (Esarey 2006). As argued by Harvey (2005), 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the ‘freeing up’ of the global economy have been those 
who already have access to capital – the existing global economic elite. In this 
Chinese case, the access only belonged to the owners of those previously non-
tradable shares, as they were provided opportunities to “sell those shares high, and 
buy back low to [still] maintain the control” (Wan 2005, p. 180) during this partial 
privatisation of public assets.     
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 To smaller retail investors, the consequence of this kind of information 
asymmetry was extremely harmful. Wang (2005) showed that retail investors – 
individuals investing their own funds as opposed to institutional investors –  
accounted for 99.52 percent of total A-share accounts in China by the end of 2004.  
These individuals, who had not been fully informed about the potential impacts of 
JieJin on the markets, would hold the shares with unrealistic optimism, misled by the 
media, when the markets started to fall. A survey conducted by the Hong Kong-based 
broadcasting company Phoenix News Service showed that 88.6 percent of investors 
had a loss from A-shares trading in 2008, of whom 48 percent lost over 50 percent of 
their total capital (Phoenix News 2008). This signals the possibility, as Harvey (2005, 
p. 150) described, that China’s move towards neoliberalisation “has achieved rapid 
growth and alleviated the poverty of many, but it has also embraced great 
concentrations of wealth in the upper echelons of society”.  
 
 The issue of dominant state ownership in listed companies was not resolved 
by this reform. As Cahill (2010) argued, this is reflective of ‘really existing 
neoliberalism’. No matter what domestic and global investors expected of the results 
of this reform, the state can still be the dominant shareholder in these listed 
companies. The aim to maintain control has actually been stipulated clearly in another 
document, released by the CSRC on 23 August 2005: 
 
The Share Reform is designed to float the former non-tradable shares rather than for the 
purpose of unloading state-owned shares through the open market…The controlling 
shareholder of the state-controlled listed company shall determine a reasonable minimum 
stake in the listed company under its control in light of the national layout and structural 
adjustment strategy with respect to the public sector economy. State capital shall be 
persistently maintained to the extent that it holds dominant control and acts as the leading 
force in sectors that are vital to the national economy and public welfare, as well as in the 
state-controlled listed companies that are fundamental and the pillar for the national 
economy. Where necessary, the state-owned shareholders may increase its stake in such 
listed companies through buying shares in the open market27 (China Securities Regulatory 
Commission 2005b). 
 
Although the SSSR was designed to change the ownership structure of Chinese 
listed companies through the conversion of non-tradable shares into tradable ones, the 
reform did little more than offer access to shares the state deemed to be superfluous to 
their needs, producing a ‘win-win’: Chinese elites within government and the business 
community could have access to speculative market gains previously off limits; at the 
same time, the government would maintain ultimate control of the sectors it deemed 
‘vital to the national economy and public welfare’,  and could signal its commitment 
to the kind of free market desired by global investors and organisations, such as the 
WTO. None of this produced the kind of trickle-down benefits or market efficiencies 
that proponents of the reform had promised.   
 
As has been discussed previously, FVA exacerbates the problem, as it requires 
that financial-statement preparers quote the observable market price as a ‘fair value’ 
and that the resulting value changes are carried into the income statement. Given the 
level of government control and ownership within the market and the regulatory 
intervention required to support the reform, the market is far from free, and is a long 
way from being the kind of market upon which the logic of FVA relies. Even so, the 
accounting techniques adopted within the newly globalised Chinese economy perform 
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an important function, as they demonstrate the government’s ongoing commitment to 
globalism and free markets – although each remains  highly contestable in practice (Li 
2010).  
 
Conclusion 
 
If we are to understand the role of accounting in socio-political struggles, we 
must explore it within many different contexts. We know that accounting does more 
than reflect financial reality – this has been well-documented – but we still know too 
little about the role accounting practice can play in the mobilisation of particular 
ideologies, because of its propensity to mask this in the neutral language of technical 
necessity. The research in this paper is firmly positioned within this ongoing critical 
research project. Through an exploration of accounting change in China, we have 
argued that FVA institutionalises a technical commitment to the ideals of 
neoliberalism: for FVA to work, it requires a free and active capital market. And 
according to its proponents, by extension, the efficiency of the market requires 
minimal government intervention and ownership. Although FVA has not created the 
conditions of neoliberalism in China, it has sustained them. It has legitimised the 
transformation of the market and has supported the appearance of an efficient market 
in terms established within global capitalism (deregulation, privatisation and IFRS).  
 
This process is complicated by the fact that neoliberalism in practice diverges 
from its theoretical ideals. Given the extent of this divergence, political economists 
now argue that this is an essential feature of neoliberalism (Harvey 2010). Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in China. We have demonstrated that, through the SSSR, the 
Chinese government has adopted reforms that signal a commitment to the broad tenets 
of neoliberalism: privatisation of public assets; deregulation of markets; and the 
adoption of international reporting standards.  The Chinese government has defended 
the reforms as necessary to create greater welfare for all in China. In practice, the 
reforms have delivered market volatility that was capitalised on by a relatively few 
well-positioned speculative investors. The claim to enhanced market efficiency that 
was to be achieved through the reform is an illusion that is partly constituted through 
FVA. In reality the government still controls the proportion of shares it requires to 
control and influence the market. Information about the reforms has been limited to a 
‘fee-paying’ elite within China, making it virtually impossible for the vast majority of 
the Chinese population, let alone retail investors already active in the market, to 
actually participate in the market for the new shares. The inequity in wealth 
distribution within China has worsened.  
 
 FVA has also produced significant volatility in the Chinese capital market – a 
volatility that has sustained the Chinese elite but has negatively affected ordinary 
investors in China. It has also quarantined ownership of significant community 
infrastructure away from the vast majority of Chinese people into the hands of a small 
number of well-positioned, ‘informed’ investors. The lack of public information about 
the SSSR has compounded this problem. As a result, we have argued that Chinese 
share prices can never reflect ‘fair values’, as these depend on a free market in which 
all parties are ‘knowledgeable’ and ‘willing’, and where transactions happen at ‘arm’s 
length’. In the Chinese context, FVA can only ever exist in name – as a symbol of 
China’s commitment to global capitalism. To this end, China’s adoption of IFRS 
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requires an embrace of so much more than comparable accounting techniques. It 
requires a commitment to the ongoing neoliberalisation of China that is disconnected 
from the underlying political and economic architecture that is operating within China. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE), released in 2006, consists of a new 
Basic Standard and 38 specific ASBEs, 17 of which specifically adopt FVA as either an initial or 
subsequent recognition and measurement method (Chinese Accounting Standard Committee 2007, 
available at: http://www.casc.gov.cn/kjfg/200607/t20060703_337130.htm). 
2 Harvey (2005, p. 2) defined neoliberalism as “in the first instance a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade”.  
3 The rise of financial capitalism has been described by Harvey (2005), Dumenil and Levy (2005), 
Palma (2009) and many others. The term ‘financialisation’ refers to the increased use of financial 
transactions, rather than through production and trade, to produce profit. This has been possible 
because of the deregulation of the global financial sector. 
4 As Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000, p.15) wrote: “[T]rained, as virtually all American economists are, 
to believe that the market is always superior to organizations in the efficient allocation of resources, 
these economists were ideologically predisposed against corporate – that is, managerial – control over 
the allocation of resources and returns in the economy.” According to this theory, therefore, it is better 
to let the market coordinate corporate control. The current version of this market has functioned in a 
way that disciplines managers whose companies perform poorly through a take-over mechanism, and 
corporate performance is evaluated through its ‘financial’ performance. 
5 However, this often refers to ‘over-the-counter markets’ through which these assets are primarily 
traded. 
6 Chinese text: '企业会计准则第 22 号 – 金融工具确认和计量'. More detail of this standard and its 
comparison with the IFRS are available at: http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0607prcifrsenglish.pdf. 
7 As discussed above, under the current IASB framework, the ‘fair value’ is defined as “the amount for 
which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an 
arm’s length transaction” (the International Accounting Standards Board 2006, available at: 
http://eifrs.iasb.org/eifrs/bnstandards/en/framework.pdf). The IASB published an Exposure Draft in 
June 2009 for Fair Value Measurement, in which it proposed to change the definition of ‘fair value’ to 
“the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction 
between market participants at the measurement date” (International Accounting Standards Board 2009, 
available at: http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/C2F93A23-64EF-409C-A8F2-
FC98B6466285/0/PREDFairValueMeasurementMJCB0509.pdf).  
8 The index numbers are quoted from Shanghai Stock Exchange, www.sse.com.cn. 
9 This refers to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. which declared bankruptcy in 2008. 
10 The bailouts during the GFC are a powerful example of this. 
11 More details of the restrictions can be found in Liu (2006).  
12 This draws on the work of Hayek, which became increasingly popular within the liberal intellectual 
classes in China from 1990 onwards. 
13 Harvey (2005) gives more examples. 
14 Original Chinese text: “第二十七条 改革后公司原非流通股股份的出售，应当遵守下列规定：
(一)自改革方案实施之日起，在十二个月内不得上市交易或者转让；(二)持有上市公司股份总数
百分之五以上的原非流通股股东，在前项规定期满后，通过证券交易所挂牌交易出售原非流通
股股份，出售数量占该公司股份总数的比例在十二个月内不得超过百分之五，在二十四个月内
不得超过百分之十.” 
15 Original Chinese text: “解禁”. 
16 Original Chinese text: “根据政策，非流通股转为流通股后需要等待 12 至 24 个月后才可以上市
流通， 一年后将会有 370 亿（7400 亿的 5%）的非流通股进入市场，这个数量甚至超过 2003 和
2004 所有的 IPO 的总和。解禁期过后，所有的 3000 亿解禁股将会被抛售，只要市场价格高于
2.8 元每股的成本价…非流通股的股东们会在高位上卖出股票，然后再低位上再买进来继续保持
控股权…接下来的三年市场将有不可承受的压力.” 
17 Original Chinese text: “2007 年的牛市已经成功地吸收了解禁带来的冲击，但是，随着解禁数
量的增加和累积效果，如果宏观环境恶化及市场流动性不能跟上的话，市场将遭遇不可承受的
冲击.” 
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18  For comparison, the volume of newly issued shares in 2007 was only about 43 billion shares 
(http://news.cnlist.com/CnlistNewsDetail.aspx?tablename=dtlmb&GUID={3F652350-EC99-4F6C-
A66F-DEAFA09F5C9F} accessed by 17 July 2010). 
19 This has fed the argument that it is in the public’s interest because now shares are being traded in 
bigger volumes, meaning more participation in the market. This is, however, suspicious given the 
possibility of unevenly distributed information. 
20 Original Chinese text: “基金界人士称大非减持压力有限”. 
21 Original Chinese text: “解禁最高峰尚未到来 A股不堪限售股解禁之压”. 
22 Original Chinese text: “限售股今天迎来解禁高潮 压防套压压压”. 
23 These companies are: “ShuangLu Pharmaceutic (双鹭药业), Nanjing Harbour (南京港), Fuxing 
Technology (福星科技), Tianmao Group (天茂集团), Zhejiang Sunshine (浙江阳光), Shenton MTR 
(申通地铁)”. 
24 This section had been removed from this website on 9 April 2011 when the authors revisited the site.  
25 This is the ‘legitimised’ web-search engine endorsed by the Chinese government after Google was 
expelled from China in 2010 due to its refusal to comply with the censorship policy imposed by the 
government. 
26 The market went from 6092 points on 16 October 2007 to about 2000 points by February 2008 
(Shanghai Stock Exchange, www.sse.com.cn). 
27 Original Chinese text: “股压分置改革是压非流通股可上市交易作出的制度安排,并不以通压压
本市压减持国有股份压目的,当前国家也没有通压境内压本市压减持上市公司国有股份压集压金
的考压。非流通股可上市交易后,国有控股上市公司控股股压压根据国家压于国有压压布局和压
构性压整的压略性要求,合理确定在所控股上市公司的最低持股比例,压压系国压民生及国家压压
命脉的重要行压和压压压域,以及国民压压基压性和支柱性行压中的国有控股上市公司,国家要保
压国有压本的控制力、影响力和压压力,必要压国有股股压可通压压券市压增持股份”. 
